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1 Introduction 
 
This paper explores whether the positive duties placed on the state by the 
Constitution of South Africa, 1  particularly the South African Police Service 
(hereinafter „SAPS‟), are adequately represented by the doctrine of vicarious liability. 
The doctrine was developed in a private law setting and since the inception of the 
Constitution it has been stretched to vindicate the Bill of Rights. This stretching has 
resulted in a number of tears in the law‟s fabric and the best solution which comes to 
mind is to patch the tears with the doctrine of constitutional damages.  
It is argued in this paper that the doctrine of constitutional damages is a viable 
alternative to vicarious liability in certain circumstances. This is achieved by 
identifying some of the pertinent difficulties associated with the application of 
vicarious liability to cases where institutional failures have resulted in the police 
causing physical injury to citizens. It is not argued that vicarious liability has no 
application. It will still apply where a factual nexus shows a relationship between the 
state official and the plaintiff that is characteristically private, a simple example being 
an on-duty policeman negligently riding his bicycle into a citizen who suffers broken 
ribs from the accident. Further, recent developments to the doctrine of Charter 
damages in Canada are used to show how a general framework for constitutional 
damages can be established.  Canada is a good comparator for two reasons. First, 
there is a stark similarity between section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of 
Freedoms and Rights and section 38 of the Constitution. Secondly, Canada, like 
South Africa, permits civil suits against the police via vicarious liability. Ultimately it is 
submitted that where the police cause physical injury and the relationship between 
the state official and plaintiff is vertical in nature or no specific member(s) of SAPS 
                                                          
1
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the “Constitution”) ss 1, 7, 205. 
2 
 
can be identified as the cause of injury, constitutional damages serve as a more 
„appropriate relief‟ than vicarious liability.  
First, vicarious liability as it currently operates will be explained. Next the issues 
that have arisen through its use in four cases involving the SAPS will be discussed. 
Then the South African doctrine of constitutional damages will be explained. This will 
be followed by an explanation of a similar doctrine in Canada and how it can be used 
to establish a South African framework for constitutional damages. 
 
2 Vicarious Liability   
 
The use of the vicarious liability doctrine to hold the South African government 
liable for the wrongs of its employees acting within the scope of their authority is 
derived from the State Liability Act 20 of 1957 which prescribes its exclusive use in 
this regard.2 This is a model example of a mixed legal system.3 South Africa‟s use of 
vicarious liability flows from its English heritage, however it is infused with the 
Roman-Dutch principles of delict. The use of vicarious liability is a manifestation of 
Dicey‟s “equality principle” which envisages state liability being regulated through 
private law doctrines.4 The result of the „equality principle‟ is the state being treated 
as any other private person under the law.5 What this fails to account for are the 
positive duties placed on the South African state by section 7(1) of the Constitution.6 
As du Bois puts it, „the state is regarded as having a special responsibility, different 
to private persons – its raison d’être lies in serving and protecting the public‟.7 Before 
looking at the difficulties this has caused, it is necessary to understand how the state 
is currently held liable. This will be done using the SAPS as an example. When the 
SAPS cause members of the public to suffer physical injury - whether caused by a 
sole member of the police, a number of policemen or through an omission of the 
enterprise generally - the state can only be held vicariously liable.8 The necessary, 
and together sufficient, conditions to hold the state vicariously liable are: 
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1) A delict was committed against the plaintiff by the employee; 
2) This person was at the time of the delict an employee of the defendant; and 
3) This person was acting in the course and scope of his or her employment.9 
 
The first condition requires that a delict was committed against the plaintiff by the 
employee. In South Africa a person is liable in delict where his or her culpable 
conduct caused proximate harm to the plaintiff and the conduct was „wrongful‟ in a 
delictual sense.10 The second and third conditions require that the employee had 
committed the delict whilst acting in the course and scope of his employment. Where 
these conditions are met delictual liability is strictly imputed onto the state due to its 
relationship with the tortfeasor.11   
 
3 A closer look at post-constitutional vicarious liability 
 
The two ground-breaking judgments of Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security12  and K v Minister of Safety and Security13  shed new light on how the 
courts are to approach the issue of state liability in the current constitutional setting. 
Importantly the cases endorsed the traditional approach of vicarious liability for 
negligent and intentional wrongs respectively, notwithstanding the inherent 
resistance the private law doctrines posed.14 In attempting to fit state liability into a 
traditionally private law doctrine the Constitutional Court had to adjust the vicarious 
liability doctrine accordingly. This, as will be shown, led to the Court to commit some 
irreconcilable doctrinal errors. First, Carmichele and Minister of Safety and Security v 
van Duivenboden15  will be discussed and the errors which have been identified 
considered. Thereafter I will discuss the K v Minister of Safety and Security16 in the 
same light.  
The Carmichele case, and following it van Duivenboden, established the South 
African approach to state liability for police failing to safeguard citizens from physical 
harm. In Carmichele the Constitutional Court subtly endorsed the vicarious liability 
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doctrine by allowing the claim to remain founded in delict.17 Here the plaintiff sought 
to hold the state vicariously liable for the police and prosecuting authorities‟ failure to 
properly oppose the pre-trial release of her assailant.18 The focus of the judgment fell 
on whether the SAPS and state prosecutors owed her a legal duty to protect her 
rights, including the rights to life, dignity, freedom and security, and privacy.19  The 
plaintiff argued that the court should develop the common law test for wrongfulness 
(which establishes whether a legal duty was owed to the plaintiff by the defendant) to 
include considerations of the state‟s positive duties to uphold the Bill of Rights.20 
Answering this, the Court held that the court a quo was incorrect in applying a test 
devoid of these considerations and remitted the case back to the High Court.21 This 
showed that the Constitution required the state‟s duties to differ from that of private 
persons – a distinct break from the English ideology which underpinned the vicarious 
liability doctrine up until this point. However, maintaining the use of delict and 
vicarious liability introduced its own difficulty: the courts did not distinguish between 
the duties owed by the tortfeasor and the duties owed by the state. Establishing 
whether a duty is owed by the tortfeasor falls within the first requirement of vicarious 
liability. Whether the state owes a legal duty to the plaintiff is irrelevant because 
liability is strictly imputed.22  
Following Carmichele was the van Duivenboden judgment which heeded the 
Constitutional Court‟s call. 23  Here the plaintiff successfully sought damages 
vicariously from the state for certain police officers negligently failing to confiscate a 
firearm from a man who was clearly unfit to bear it and who subsequently shot the 
plaintiff.24 The Court found that a legal duty was owed by the state to the plaintiff by 
recognising that there was an infringement of the plaintiff‟s rights; 25 that the state 
had a positive constitutional duty to protect the rights in the Bill of Rights; 26 and that 
a novel norm of accountability rested on the state.27 Further, the Court held that 
where no other effective remedies except an action for damages exist, the norm will 
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„ordinarily demand the recognition of a legal duty‟.28  What is important to note is that 
the Court used the duties owed by the state and the norm of accountability resting on 
the state to establish the wrongfulness of the conduct of the identifiable tortfeasors. 
This line of reasoning again disregards the first necessary condition of vicarious 
liability: that the delict perpetrated against the plaintiff must be committed by a 
person other than the defendant. It conflates the wrongfulness of the state‟s conduct 
with that of the wrongfulness of the policemen‟s conduct.29 Fagan identifies that 
imposing the state‟s duties onto the employee in order to hold the state liable 
„instrumentalises‟ the employee. 30 This ignores the right to human dignity of the 
employee.31 Boonzaier also exposes that the South African approach to state liability 
has become circular in nature:  
 
“Bizarrely, the state can be held liable only if an employee has committed a delict, and yet 
our courts are now finding that such employee [sic] has committed a delict only if they 
mean to hold the state liable.”32 
 
This is a difficulty which has arisen for South African courts in attempting to use a 
private law doctrine to regulate state liability in the post-constitutional era.33 The 
problem also manifested itself in Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security.34 Here 
the plaintiff sued the state vicariously for their negligent failure to prevent the escape 
of her assailant from police custody. 35  The facts do not establish a specific 
policeman responsible for the failure but rather the SAPS generally.36 This presents 
the problem of how the state is to be held vicariously liable for failures which are 
institutional in nature. It is in this context that the doctrine of constitutional damages 
is a viable alternative to vicarious liability. However, the Court chose to hold the state 
                                                          
28
 447. 
29
 Fagan (2008) SALJ 659; Boonzaier (2013) SALJ 339-342.  
30
 Fagan (2008) SALJ 668-669. 
31
 Fagan (2008) SALJ 668-669; Also see Marias JA‟s dissent in Minister of Safety and Security v Van 
Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA) 452-453: “…usually the omissions of individual functionaries of 
the State which render it potentially liable. If one is minded to hold the State liable, one will at the 
same time be holding the individual functionary liable. That he or she may never be called upon to 
pay is not a good reason for ignoring the concomitant personal liability which will be inherent in finding 
the State liable…It is simply a reminder that more is at stake than imposing liability upon an 
amorphous entity such as the State”. 
32
 Boonzaier (2013) SALJ 342. 
33
 Du Bois (2010) Tulane Euro Civ LF 174-5. 
34
 2003 1 SA 398 (SCA).  
35
 394. 
36
 Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 1 SA 398 (SCA) 400; Also see Boonzaier (2013) 
SALJ 342. 
6 
 
liable using vicarious liability, in line with the van Duivenboden judgment, even 
though it is wholly unsuited to accomplish this.  
The second difficulty involves the application of the third aforementioned 
requirement of the vicarious liability doctrine. This requires that the tortfeasor 
committed the delict whilst acting in the course and scope of his or her 
employment. 37  The seminal case in this regard is K v Minister of Safety and 
Security 38  which laid down the current constitutionally inspired approach to this 
requirement in deviation cases. An employee is acting within the course and scope 
of his or her employment if: 
 
1. the delict was done solely for the purpose of the employee; and 
2. there was a real and sufficiently close connection between the delict 
committed and the business or purposes of their employer.39 
 
It is the second condition which has led to difficulty when applied in K v Minister of 
Safety and Security40 and subsequently in F v Minister of Safety and Security.41 In 
the K v Minister of Safety and Security42 the plaintiff had been raped by three on-duty 
policemen who had agreed to give her a lift home.43 This clearly establishes that the 
first element was satisfied. 44  In establishing that a sufficiently close connection 
existed, the Court relied on two premises. The first premise relied on the fact that the 
policemen breached their constitutional duty to prevent crime and protect members 
of the public.45 Secondly, their employment as policemen had led to the plaintiff to 
trust them and it was this trust which gave rise to the opportunity of the rape.46 It is 
the first premise which creates a problem. As Fagan illustrates, it “defies common 
sense” to rely on the fact that a breach of a duty of employment shows that an 
employee‟s delict has a “close connection” to their employer‟s business or purpose.47 
If one endorses this line of reasoning, it leads to the absurd result that a policeman 
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who constantly commits crimes has a closer connection to the Minister of Police than 
a conscientious policeman.48  As Froneman JA puts in in his dissent in the F v 
Minister of Safety and Security 2012 1 SA 536 (CC), “it is no part of the work of 
policemen to rape women”.49  
It is submitted that these problems, and others, 50  are a result of forcing a 
relationship characterised as vertical – that between the state and its citizens – into a 
mechanism designed to regulate horizontal relationships – that between two private 
persons.51  The reason given by the courts for using delict and vicarious liability is 
the lack of alternatives. In van Eeden it was said: 
 
“An important consideration in favour of recognising delictual liability for damages on the 
part of the State in circumstances such as the present is that there is no other practical 
and effective remedy available to the victim of violent crime. Conventional remedies such 
as review and mandamus or interdict do not afford the victim of crime any relief at all. The 
only effective remedy is a private law delictual action for damages.”52 
 
Similarly, in van Duivenboden where delictual damages were awarded it was said, 
“there is no effective way to hold the state to account in the present case other than 
by way of an action for damages”.53 It is submitted that vicarious liability is no longer 
the only form of effective relief available. This is due to the development of the 
doctrine of constitutional damages in South Africa and abroad, specifically Canada. 
 
4 Constitutional damages in South Africa 
 
The starting point for a claim for constitutional damages in South Africa is section 
38 of the Constitution.54 The section provides that:  
 
“Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a 
right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights.”55  
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Before dealing with the cases concerned with this section, it is necessary to 
discuss Fose v Minister of Safety and Security56 which dealt with a provision, with 
the same effect, under the Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993, namely section 
7(4)(a). Here the plaintiff had allegedly been assaulted by various policemen.57 He 
sought punitive constitutional damages from the state for the violations of his rights, 
over and above the delictual damages claimed for the same conduct.58 The legal 
issue was whether it was “appropriate” to award constitutional damages assuming 
that the plaintiff had already received compensatory damages.59 Ultimately the Court 
held that such “punitive” damages were not appropriate in the circumstances as they 
would not succeed in vindicating the infringed rights nor would it deter future 
violations.60 What is important for our purposes is that the Court explicitly left open 
the questions whether vicarious liability was an adequate basis for state liability and 
generally whether South African law relating to state liability was, then, consistent 
with the Interim Constitution, specifically whether it provided “appropriate relief”.61  
This is significant because vicarious liability and the State Liability Act were not 
directly tested against constitutional muster in this regard. Further, the Court in an 
obiter statement regarding constitutional damages said that “there is no reason in 
principle why appropriate relief should not include an award of damages, where such 
an award is necessary to protect and enforce rights”. 62 Before determining what 
“appropriate relief” entails, it is necessary to understand why the Court in Fose, and 
following it Carmichele and van Duivenboden, assumed that delict was appropriate. 
In Fose, Ackermann JA acknowledged that “in many cases the common law will 
be broad enough to provide all the relief that would be “appropriate” for a breach of 
constitutional rights”. 63  Bishop further identifies that the courts in the current 
constitutional era have adopted a principle of subsidiary whereby private law 
remedies, which adequately vindicate the Bill of Rights, should be favoured over 
novel constitutional law remedies such as constitutional damages.64 This approach 
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was seen as particularly fitting in the South African law of delict because, unlike tort 
law of other Commonwealth jurisdictions, constitutional rights can be effectively 
vindicated through acknowledging them in the “open-ended” wrongfulness inquiry.65 
Furthermore section 39(2) of the Constitution allows the courts to develop any 
private law remedies which do not live up to the standards required by the Bill of 
Rights. This approach is particularly favourable where the infringement arises 
between private persons. However, as was shown above, the courts have had 
conceptual difficulty in using vicarious liability where the state is a defendant and the 
breach of rights is due to an institutional failure. It is submitted that the question, left 
open in Fose, whether the current law regulating state liability provides “appropriate 
relief” must now be considered.  
When considering what appropriate relief entails in South Africa, three guiding 
principles can be discerned from the Fose judgment: effectiveness, suitability and 
just relief. These principles are not mutually exclusive and necessarily overlap. The 
Court stated that in order to protect and enforce the Constitution relief must be 
effective.66 This relates to the extent to which the remedy vindicates the Bill of Rights 
and deters future violations.67 Effectiveness is paramount in a country where so few 
have access to courts to vindicate their rights and endemic rights violations exist.68 In 
this regard, the courts have a responsibility to vindicate rights effectively and “are 
obliged to forge new tools and shape innovative remedies, if needs be, to achieve 
this goal”. 69  Moving onto suitability, Kriegler JA stated that the meaning of 
“appropriate” in this context is “specially fitted or suitable”.70 This requires the relief to 
fit the nature of the infringement, including its probable impact.71 Just relief was 
imported from Canadian jurisprudence because the Court held on a purposive 
interpretation there is no material difference between the Canadian Charter and 
section 7(4)(a) of the Interim Constitution regarding the requirement of just relief.72 
This demands that the interests of all those affected by the remedy are accounted 
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for.73 In this regard it must be noted that vindication goes beyond the person who 
suffered harm to society has a whole.74 This is because violations to a citizen‟s rights 
“impair public confidence and diminish public faith in the efficacy of the protection”.75 
Although the concept of a “just” remedy is not included in section 38 of the 
Constitution, it is submitted that section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, which provides 
that when deciding a constitutional matter a court may  make an order which is “just 
and equitable”, must be read with it.76  
The first instance where the South African courts have awarded constitutional 
damages was in the line of cases leading up to President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery. 77  The case involved the illegal occupation of the 
Modderklip farm by 40 000 residents of the neighbouring informal settlement. This 
violated the farm owner‟s right not to be deprived of their property.78 The farm owner 
sought an eviction order, however, in this instance this would infringe the residents‟ 
right to access to housing.79 The Court also considered expropriation but suggested 
that it was not within the court‟s jurisdiction to order the state to expropriate land.80 
Due to a lack of alternative remedies the Constitutional Court approved the court a 
quo‟s decision to award constitutional damages to the farm owner for the violation to 
their rights as the most appropriate relief.  What must be noted is that the Court was 
willing to compare different remedies and determined that constitutional damages 
was the most appropriate in the circumstances. The following quote from the 
Supreme Court of Appeal judgment in the Modderklip case is apposite to the inquiry 
generally: 
 
“They [courts] should „attempt to synchronise the real world with the ideal construct of a 
constitutional world‟ and they have a duty to mould an order that will provide effective 
relief to those affected by a constitutional breach.”81 
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Likewise, in MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 82  the Court 
considered the appropriateness of awarding constitutional damages but within the 
context of socio-economic rights. The case deals the violation of section 27(1)(c) of 
the Constitution, namely, the right to access to social security. 83  The Court 
recognised that the availability of all remedies must be considered but, importantly, 
held that the relief envisaged by section 38 of the Constitution is not a remedy of last 
resort.84 Constitutional damages can be claimed directly even where other remedies 
exist, including where indirect means, such as vicarious liability, exist.85  
To sum up: section 38 of the Constitution allows the courts to grant “appropriate 
relief” to a plaintiff who alleges that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed. 
Appropriate relief can be understood as being effective, suitable and just. These 
principles together require that the relief vindicate the Bill of Rights; deter future 
violations; fit the nature of the infringement; and accounts for all the interests of 
affected parties. Further, relief derived from section 38 is not a remedy of last resort. 
The doctrine of constitutional damages derives its force from section 38 and has 
been deemed appropriate in the Modderklip and Kate cases.  
In what follows I will use these principles to discuss whether constitutional 
damages are an appropriate form of relief where due to an institutional failure the 
police violate inter alia a citizen‟s right to life, human dignity, freedom and security. 
Again it must be noted that the principles are not mutually exclusive and as such 
when determining “appropriateness” the reasoning may overlap. Are constitutional 
damages suitable given the nature of the infringement? Where the police infringe the 
citizen‟s rights in the aforementioned cases the relationship is characterized as 
“vertical”. It is vertical because, as is trite, the state, and those people through whom 
it governs, is more powerful than private persons. In Bivens v Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics86 - a US case – Brennan J lucidly shows the 
differences between interactions between citizens inter se and those between the 
state and its citizens.87 Here US federal narcotics agents had infringed a US citizen‟s 
rights by unlawfully searching the plaintiff‟s premises and arresting him without a 
warrant.88 The Court said: 
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“Respondents seek to treat the relationship between a citizen and a federal agent 
unconstitutionally exercising his authority as no different from the relationship between 
two private citizens. In so doing, they ignore the fact that power, once granted, does not 
disappear like a magic gift when it is wrongfully used. An agent acting - albeit 
unconstitutionally - in the name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for 
harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.”89 
 
This power asymmetry can be seen in the K v Minister of Safety and Security90 
where O‟Reagan JA places emphasis on the trust that the plaintiff placed on the 
policemen. 91  Being state officials gave the policeman an opportunity that other 
citizens would not have had. This is significant because delictual liability has been 
historically developed to regulate relationships of citizens inter se and, as was shown 
above, vicarious liability struggles to incorporate the vertical nature of the 
relationship between the state and its citizens. 92 In contrast, using a constitutional 
remedy such as constitutional damages against the state will naturally recognise the 
vertical nature of the relationship. This can be illustrated by comparing the so-called 
norm of accountability with section 7 of the Constitution. Section 7(1) of the 
Constitution states: 
 
 “This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights 
of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality 
and freedom.”  
 
Section 7 (2) states that “the state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights”. In van Duivenboden the court translated these provisions 
into the “norm of accountability” in order for it to accord with private law 
jurisprudence. It further held that where there is no effective remedy other than an 
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action for delictual damages, the norm will ordinarily demand the recognition of a 
legal duty on the state to protect citizens from rights violations. In contrast, a 
constitutional damages inquiry, as will be seen below, simply asks whether the state 
has respected, protected, promoted and fulfilled the rights in the Bill of Rights. In my 
view the Constitution is more suitably vindicated through this direct inquiry. 
Secondly, constitutional damages is appropriate due to its effective vindication of 
rights. Consider the differences between the objects of delictual remedies as 
opposed to constitutional remedies.  Delictual relief is primarily corrective in nature in 
the sense that it seeks to place the plaintiff back into the position as if the wrong had 
not occurred. However, the Constitution has been described as an “aspirational or 
transformative” document which seeks to promote distributive justice. 93  Where 
delictual remedies focus on compensating the individual‟s loss, constitutional 
remedies aim to vindicate the Bill of Rights and deter future violations.94 Broader 
vindication is necessary because as Kriegler J, in Fose, articulates: “the rights 
violator not only harms a particular person, but impedes the fuller realisation of our 
constitutional promise”. 95  Vicarious liability ignores this by seeking to translate 
constitutional duties owed to society into private law duties owed to individuals.96 In 
South Africa where the Constitution is supreme and puts distinct obligations on the 
state, damages for the SAPS institutional failures should serve constitutional 
purposes not the purposes of delict. 97  This would result in government liability 
vindicating rights more effectively.98  
Furthermore, the effectiveness of vicarious liability is undermined by the difficulties 
outlined earlier in the paper. Although vicarious liability can vindicate the right 
through compensation to the plaintiff, in order to achieve this it must infringe the 
rights of the state employees who become jointly liable simply because they are 
state employees. This cannot be said to be effective vindication.  Another result of 
the doctrinal errors is that well deserving plaintiffs‟ claims could fail.99 For example, 
                                                          
93
 A Price “The Influence of Human Rights on Private Common Law” (2012) 129 SALJ 330 363. 
94
 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) 798; Also see A Price The Impact of the 
Bill of Rights on State Delictual Liability for Negligence in South Africa (2010) unpublished paper 
presented at the Obligations V Conference: Rights and Private Law hosted by St Anne‟s College, 
Oxford University 15. 
95
 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) 835. 
96
 Du Bois (2010) Tulane Euro Civ LF 146. 
97
 Roach argues that the supremacy of the Canadian Charter entails that its purposes should be 
advanced rather than the purposes of tort law which is merely prescribed by the various Crown 
Liability Acts; K Roach Constitutional Remedies in Canada (1994) 11-24. 
98
 11-25. 
99
 Boonzaier (2013) SALJ 344. 
14 
 
where the infringement was caused by an institutional problem there is no specific 
official to ground vicarious liability on.100 This would be detrimental not only to the 
plaintiff‟s claim for compensation, but also result in the rights not being effectively 
vindicated.  
Third, vicarious liability does not adequately take into account all the stakeholders 
affected by rights violations and in that sense it is not “just”. As already noted, the 
effect of rights violations goes beyond the compensation of the harmed individual, 
especially where violations are institutional or endemic in nature. Whereas vicarious 
liability (properly applied) tends to focus on the employees‟ duties and then the 
relationship between the employee and the employer, constitutional damages has 
the advantage of explicitly recognising the state‟s constitutional duties and 
contingent issues, such as scarce resources, to hold them accountable and liable. 
Under the doctrine of constitutional damages the state‟s positive constitutional duties 
would naturally be taken into account and, accordingly, so would the norm of 
accountability – without the difficulties surrounding vicarious liability. Furthermore, 
constitutional damages would provide a more legitimate ground for state liability 
because it derives from the Constitution itself,101 in contrast to the pre-constitutionally 
enacted State Liability Act. 
Possible criticisms of constitutional damages should now be addressed. 
Importantly, the State Liability Act prescribes the use of vicarious liability. It must be 
noted that the State Liability Act was enacted in the pre-constitutional era and based 
on a now abandoned Diceyan ideology, and as such, is ripe to be challenged. This is 
not difficult to accept when keeping in mind what has been shown thus far. For 
example, a plaintiff‟s rights would most definitely be unjustifiably infringed if it were to 
fail on one of the abovementioned technical grounds. Also, it is interesting to note 
that the Court in Kate and in Modderklip avoided this issue altogether when awarding 
constitutional damages against the state. Further, if it is accepted that constitutional 
damages are a more appropriate form of relief, the legislature should consider itself 
bound to amend the Act in order to fulfil their constitutional duty to uphold the Bill of 
Rights.102  
The doctrine of constitutional damages, although awarded in Modderklip and 
Kate, remains a vague doctrine in South African law. Boonzaier argues that direct 
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delictual liability is a more appropriate relief than constitutional damages where state 
liability is concerned.103 He contends that maintaining the use of delict accords with 
the courts current culture of reliance on common law over direct reliance of the 
Constitution where possible.104 He proposes that this legal culture is based on inter 
alia the idea that the value of the long-developed and intricately balanced private-law 
principles is higher than the “nebulous” doctrine of constitutional damages.105 What 
this argument fails to acknowledge is the ability of courts to retain the balance of the 
so-called “sophisticated private-law principles” in new constitutional remedies. Courts 
will engage with the private law concepts that previously would have applied and 
where necessary retain suitable concepts by analogy. 106  Another important tool 
which can be utilised to maintain the “sophistication” is suitable comparative 
analysis. For this reason it is necessary to look to recent developments in Canadian 
law. 
 
5 The recent development of Charter damages in Canada 
 
The recent development in Vancouver (City) v Ward107 has significantly advanced 
the doctrine of Charter damages in Canada. Although it has received praise, it must 
be noted that this development is not entrenched and its future remains in doubt.108 
Before discussing the case the caution raised in Fose regarding comparative 
analysis must be addressed. 109  There are significant differences between the 
Canadian law of tort and the South African law of delict. For example, where Canada 
has narrower grounds to hold the state vicariously liable under the torts of 
misfeasance in a public office and the tort of negligent investigation,110 the South 
African law of delict has the ability to find the state liable on a wider range of 
grounds.111 Second, sovereign immunity and state liability are treated differently in 
these jurisdictions, although Canada, like South Africa, does not recognise immunity 
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for the police.112 Last, the constitutional dispensations differ by nature and history.113 
It is submitted that the purpose of addressing this Canadian case is to provide an 
example of how a framework for Charter damages has been developed, not when it 
is appropriate to use it in a South African context. As such, although the differences 
must be kept in mind, they will not affect the usefulness of the comparison. Also the 
general structure for state liability in Canada is similar to South Africa in the sense 
that the police are traditionally held vicariously liable in tort for civil redress. 114 
Further the significant similarity between section 38 of the Constitution and section 
24(1) of the Charter, recognised in Fose, improves the usefulness of the comparison. 
Section 24(1) provides: 
 
“Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or 
denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court 
considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.” 
 
The Ward case involved a plaintiff who had his car seized, was detained and strip 
searched without legal cause.115 The court a quo found that the city had breached 
the plaintiff‟s right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned and thereby committed 
the tort of wrongful imprisonment (which generally falls under intentional torts) by 
holding the plaintiff in lockup for longer than necessary and as a result was awarded 
damages (vicariously). 116 However, the Court found that the car seizure and strip 
search breached the plaintiff‟s right to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure and awarded him Charter damages.117 It was the award of Charter damages 
which was the focus of the appeal in Ward.118  The first point of interest is how the 
Supreme Court of Canada interpreted what an “appropriate and just” remedy entails. 
The Court per McLachlin CJ emphasized the broad discretion that s24 (1) gives 
courts and that it would improper for any court to reduce it.119 Clarification on what it 
entails would not reduce this discretion.120  Following earlier Canadian case law the 
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Court held that an “appropriate and just” order will inter alia meaningfully and 
legitimately vindicate the rights and freedoms of the claimant and be fair to the party 
the order is made against.121 These broadly reflect the abovementioned principles 
enunciated in Fose. McLachlin CJ held that Charter damages meet these conditions 
but because is a new remedy it will have to be incrementally developed.122 This 
shows that the Court saw it as their endeavour to lay down the foundational 
framework, not necessarily a comprehensive one.   
Secondly, the Court in Ward identified the distinct nature of Charter damages. The 
Court explicitly stated that it is a direct claim against the state in order to distinguish it 
from vicarious liability.123 Nonetheless, the Court was not deterred from utilising the 
relevant underlying policy considerations of vicarious liability as a conceptual aid to 
informing the Charter damages inquiry.124  This was most clear when the Court was 
determining the quantum of damages.125  
Next, the Court laid down a four step test to determine when Charter damages 
may be awarded which could serve as an example of how South Africa could 
establish a framework for constitutional damages for state liability under section 38 
of the Constitution. Each step will be explained and suggestions made on how these 
are apposite to South African law. The steps are as follows: 
 
1. Proof of a Charter Breach; 
2. Functional Justification of Damages; 
3. Countervailing Factors; and 
4. Quantum of Charter Damages. 
 
The first step is for the plaintiff to prove that one or more of their Charter rights 
were breached by the state.126 The Supreme Court in Ward did not elaborate on this 
step and simply accepted the trial judge‟s finding that the strip search and seizure 
was a violation of the Charter.127  It is submitted that this step could be developed to 
include a causation element. 128  In South African law it would be articulated as 
whether the state has breached one or more of the plaintiff‟s rights contained in the 
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Bill of Rights and would normally be prima facie satisfied. The courts should, as the 
Court in Ward indicated it was willing to do, use the already established concepts of 
causation in delict and criminal law, where relevant, to inform this step by analogy.129 
For example the law of delict has developed extensive tests for legal causation 
which can be used as a conceptual guide for whether the state had breached the 
plaintiff‟s rights.130 This would allow the courts space to determine the appropriate 
boundary for liability for the doctrine of constitutional damages.  
The second step, named “functional justification of damages”, requires that the 
damages sought serve a “useful function or purpose”.131 For Charter damages this 
entails furthering the general objects of the Charter by remedying the personal loss 
caused by the rights violation via compensation; vindicating Charter rights to affirm 
constitutional values; and deterring future violations by the state.132 Essentially this 
step seeks to prove that the Charter damages are “appropriate and just”.133 It is 
submitted that although “functional justification for damages” is foreign to South 
African law, translated into South African jurisprudence the step essentially entails 
showing that damages would be “appropriate relief” in the circumstances. This could 
be achieved by reference to the abovementioned principles of effectiveness, 
suitability and just relief which flow from section 38 of the Constitution.  
It is important to note that at this stage in the test, if the plaintiff was successful in 
the previous two steps, a prima facie case is established against the state.134 This 
means that at this point the onus lies on the state to show other factors which would 
render Charter damages as inappropriate or unjust in step three.135 The prima facie 
liability accords with the positive constitutional duties on the South African state and 
the so-called norm of accountability. 
The third step is for the state to establish that there are countervailing factors 
which point away from awarding damages being “appropriate and just”, in other 
words the state has the opportunity to refute the prima facie case.136 The Court in 
Ward only establishes two considerations but recognised that the law in this regard 
must be left open for further development. 137  First, if the state can prove the 
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existence of an alternative remedy that serves the same function as Charter 
damages, it can avoid liability.138 This consideration is a practical one which seeks to 
avoid double compensation.139 The Court stated that the alternative remedy must 
successfully and sufficiently cure the breach - the mere fact that another remedy, 
private or constitutional, exists is not sufficient.140 This consideration is relevant to 
South African law because in certain circumstances both vicarious liability and 
constitutional damages could concurrently apply. Whichever the Court considers 
most appropriate must result in the other being barred from the claimant as grounds 
for relief.  
The second consideration is “good governance”. The Court boldly stated that the 
argument which holds that an award of damages has a “chilling effect” on effective 
governance cannot alone avoid liability.141 The Court declared that damages will in 
fact promote good governance in the sense that it improves compliance with the 
Charter.142 The Court required that the claimant must show a “minimum threshold of 
gravity” to exclude the state from arguing that damages would interfere with good 
governance.143 Effective governance raises complex separation of powers issues for 
South African law. It also straddles administrative law‟s territory. Whereas section 33 
of the South African Bill of Rights contains the right to just administrative action, the 
Canadian Charter does not contain a corresponding right. In South Africa, section 33 
is vindicated through administrative law, specifically through the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. What complicates the issue further is the fact 
that damages has been awarded as a remedy under the PAJA in Darson 
Construction v City of Cape Town.144 It is submitted that recourse to the PAJA would 
be more appropriate where such issues are raised.  
A defence which would most likely be raised under this step if it were applied in 
South Africa is the problem of government resource constraints. This can be seen in 
the so called “municipality cases”, for example McIntosh v Premiere, Kwazulu-
Natal,145  where the municipality sought to avoid being held vicariously liable by 
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arguing their conduct was not negligent due to resource constraints.146 It is possible 
to maintain the line of reasoning the Court engaged in by requiring a separate step 
requiring fault. Roach and Cooper-Stephenson in their respective books on 
Canadian Charter damages argue that fault, including negligence, could be a distinct 
step in the Charter damages inquiry. In South Africa, constitutional damages test 
whether the state has lived up to the requirements of section 7 of the Constitution, or 
as articulated in van Duivenboden, the norm of accountability. Resource constraints 
are naturally a barrier for the state to meet its section 7 requirements. It follows that 
the state should have the opportunity to show that the violation occurred due to lack 
of resources. This could take the form of proving a valid defence under 
“countervailing measures” or showing that the state was not at fault. 
The last step is to determine the quantum of damages. 147  Quantification of 
damages for rights violations is a complex area of the law. In Ward the Court 
recognised that quantum must correspond to the spirit of section 24(1) which 
provides that relief must be appropriate and just. In a similar vein, quantum must 
also be fair to the plaintiff and the state.148 When considering what is fair the Court 
identified the following concerns:  
 
1. that large awards and the consequent diversion of public funds may not serve 
the needs of the claimant;  
2. the public interest in good governance; 
3. the danger of deterring government from undertaking new policies; and 
4. the diversion of funds from public programs to private interests. 
 
The measure of damages was categorised into compensation, vindication and 
deterrence. Generally compensation will be the primary mode of restitution with 
vindication and deterrence playing “supporting roles”.149 The Court stated that both 
pecuniary loss and non-pecuniary loss would be claimable under compensation. 
Pecuniary loss, including physical and psychological injuries, would be calculated 
according to the trite restitutio in integrum maxim.150  Non-pecuniary loss, for pain 
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and suffering, would also follow the private law “modest conventional rate”. 151 
Damages serving vindication and deterrence would be calculated using rationality 
and proportionality. 152  The key consideration would be “the seriousness of the 
breach evaluated with regard to the impact of the breach on the claimant and the 
seriousness of the state misconduct”. 153  The Court noted that vindication and 
deterrence could take on a “punitive aspect”.  
In South Africa pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensation to the plaintiff would 
also clearly be available. However, Fose rejected any notion of punitive damages 
where the plaintiff had been compensated for losses.154 The reasons for this are 
sound. The Court held that for damages to have any deterring effect on government 
it would have to be substantial.155 This would not be fair to society writ large and 
would be an inappropriate diversion of state funds.156 On the other end of the scale, 
the Court saw nominal awards to trivialise the rights involved.157 Hence it would 
seem that the measure in South Africa, for now, would remain compensatory. 
However, the vindicatory aspect can be seen as an implicit declaration in step one of 
the inquiry.  
The purpose of reviewing the Ward case was to see an example of how Canada 
has begun to develop a framework to regulate the use of Charter damages and how 
South African legal concepts suit such an inquiry. The framework would improve the 
certainty of the application of constitutional damages. Further, legal causation in step 
one, countervailing factors in step three and the restricted quantum of damages in 
step four avoid concerns of the primordial legal “floodgates” opening. However, like 
South Africa, the advent of Charter damages has not resulted in an overhaul of state 
liability in Canada due to the availability and historic use of vicarious liability. 
Nonetheless, it is submitted that this framework could be a step in the direction of a 
uniform doctrine of state liability in South Africa‟s legal system.  
 
6 Conclusion 
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Section 205 (1) of the Constitution of South Africa states that the police must 
prevent crime, protect citizens and uphold the law. Section 1 states inter alia that the 
South African state is founded on the advancements of rights and freedoms. Section 
2 states that the Constitution is the supreme law and that the obligations it imposes 
must be fulfilled. Section 7 states that the Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of South 
Africa‟s democracy and that the state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights.  These provisions create a distinct state personality far 
detached from the Diceyan ideology of old. The establishment of a general 
framework for constitutional damages will better serve the South African 
constitutional dispensation by vindicating the rights infringed by the state effectively 
and directly. The framework will portray the state‟s distinct character rather than 
obscuring it through vicarious liability. It further avoids the difficulties of vicarious 
liability and is in a better position to promote a society based on freedom and respect 
for human rights. It will aid in the constitutional transformative dream. Furthermore, 
by using the example set by Canada and allowing already established concepts from 
private law to guide its development, the doctrine of constitutional damages can 
retain the intricately balanced interests of all stakeholders. A defined doctrine of 
constitutional damages will provide a step forward in realising the constitutional 
vision of South Africa by ensuring the state plays the role the Constitution evinced. 
 
 
